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Abstract 
 The long-term unemployment in Slovakia belongs traditionally to the highest group of 
such in the EU and represents one of the most serious problems for the Slovak labour market. 
More than one half of the unemployed are those with the lowest level of education, this paper 
thus focuses on the current situation of the low-qualified workforce as well as on the 
assessment of the effects of activation policy programs in Slovakia which are aimed at 
stimulating the growth of labour demand, especially for those who belong to the most 
disadvantaged groups on the labour market. However, international experience (e. g. Kuddo, 
2009) points to the fact that, when taking into account the low efficiency and cost 
ineffectiveness of this measure, it simply turns into a “safety net” supporting the income of 
individuals and decreasing the poverty rate among individuals disadvantaged in the labour 
market. The studies also uncovered that in the long run the impact of such measures on 
employment is in many cases negative, defining stigmatization of the program's participants 
as one of the reasons – the persons having participated in the programs are automatically 
considered as less productive, which decreases the probability of their job placement. The 
efficiency and cost effectiveness of these programs may be influenced considerably by the 
so-called lock-in effect which means that program participants may receive less job offers 
while attending the program as well as that they may be less motivated to seek for job 
openings.  
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Introduction 
 Active labour market policy represents the complex of the programs designed to 
improve access to job openings and to enhance effective labour market functioning. It 
consists of various types of programs oriented on education, financial support for employers 
to boost new job openings, promotion of self-employment or direct support in the form of 
employment creation in the public sector. Especially those programs oriented on job creation 
are those being frequently criticized for their low efficiency, in terms that they actually do not 
improve the chances of job seekers in the open labour market, and for their insufficient cost 
effectiveness when it comes to public finance spent. There is a lack of studies that would 
provide a complex assessment of the active labour market policy programs (ALMP) in 
Slovakia, implying the evaluation of their efficiency and cost effectiveness; that is why the 
presented paper summarizes the results of the public works programs' cost-benefit analysis, 
both from the perspective of public finance as well as from the perspective of the programs' 
participants. As regards the programs' participants, we have focused on the results of a 
qualitative analysis, due to the low availability of data on participants’ incomes after job 
placement in the open labour market (on an individual basis).  
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Current situation in the labour market 
 The post-crisis situation on the Slovak labour market is of concern to many policy 
makers, unemployment rose notably due to recession in 2009 and still remains high; at the 
beginning of 2010, the number of unemployed climbed to 400 thousand persons (the value 
last seen in 2005) and although the economy’s recovery was somewhat better when compared 
to many other European states, the labour market's performance remains weak even after 
several consecutive years of economic growth. In 2013, the unemployment rate in Slovakia 
reached 14.2 % of the active population, the fifth highest in the EU (27). Low employment 
elasticity and weak relation between economic growth and job creation is known also from 
the past – even during the favourable macroeconomic development during the pre-crisis 
period, the employment threshold in the SR represented approximately 4 % (GDP growth 
rate); the rate of GDP growth at about 4 % or more was necessary to ensure employment 
growth over the decade before 2009. Also, the latest data confirms that it is again long-term 
unemployment which drives the total unemployment the most. Long-term unemployment 
currently represents more than two thirds of the total unemployment and the fact that it 
actually used to be 70 % also in the past (e. g. in 2006, at the beginning of the aforementioned 
favourable macroeconomic period) reveals that it is a structural problem and consists in 
certain specifics of the Slovak labour market.  
 Between 2002 and 2012, Slovakia ranked first among the EU countries in the long-
term unemployment rate comparison. This decade-long negative leadership reflects several 
aspects that complete the overall picture of the current situation. Unemployed persons who 
have never had a job represent 20 % to 25 % of total unemployment (in the long-term); the 
absence of work experience, skills and acquired work habits creates a serious barrier in their 
employability. Next, the problem of unemployed persons without work experience is closely 
connected with the issue of youth unemployment and the problem of a low-skilled (low-
qualified) labour force. While in the case of youth unemployment, the convergence towards 
the European average was obvious in the pre-crisis period (between 2000 and 2008 the youth 
unemployment rate figure for the SR dropped from the highest one in the EU to the eighth 
place, i.e. to the average value), in the case of low-qualified persons Slovakia occupies the 
absolute long-term leadership in the European comparison. The unemployment rate of low-
educated persons in the SR varies from 40 % to 50 % in the long-term (categories 0-2 in 
Eurostat methodology). And lastly, the problem of the aforementioned disadvantaged groups 
in the labour market is linked to the situation of the marginalized Roma community and its 
perception in the Slovak labour market. Despite a slight improvement in the employment 
situation of the low-educated in the last year (2013), still 52 % of all unemployed in Slovakia 
are those with the highest attained primary education or vocational education without school-
leaving exam (more than 200 thousand persons of a total, approximately, 386 thousand 
unemployed). Scaling up active labour market policy instruments and searching for policy 
solutions has risen on the policy agenda in the past few years, but how effective are the 
measures introduced and what are the downsides of the policy approaches adopted?  
 
Low-qualified workforce  
 Low-qualified persons participating in active labour market policy programs 
represented 93 % of all public work program participants (data from 2011) so we will focus 
on this group of unemployed a little more in detail. The issue of low-qualified constitutes a 
very specific problem of the Slovak labour market that can be demonstrated by international 
statistics. Over the majority of the last decade, the unemployment rate of low-educated 
persons in Slovakia has been exceeding the EU average by more than 30 percentage points (p. 
p.) (compare red and green line in figure 1). In 2005, when the unemployment of the low-
skilled workforce in the SR was at its highest, its value in Slovakia surpassed the EU average 
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by 41.2 percentage points (53.4 % of active population unemployed in Slovakia as opposed to 
12.2 % in today’s EU countries on average; when “low-educated” or “low-qualified” refers to 
pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education). As shown in figure 1, the difference 
between the rates of total unemployment was only 7.3 p. p. After 2005, we can see a notable 
improvement in terms of a continual decrease in the unemployment rate for the low-qualified 
that stopped in 2008 when the crisis hit the Slovak economy; however, as the unemployment 
in this segment rose in other labour markets also affected by the crisis, gradual convergence 
to the EU average continued to 2010.  
 The unemployment rate for people with the lowest (primary) education remained 
fairly constant during the crisis, the biggest increases in unemployment were recorded in the 
lower secondary education segment, the largest group of unemployed in Slovakia (especially 
those with vocational education without school-leaving exam).  
 Despite a notable improvement in the employment of the low-qualified workforce in 
Slovakia after 2005 as well as more serious post-crisis effects in some other EU countries, 
Slovakia has retained its negative leadership position among the EU states since 1998 (the 
beginning of the series when data for most of today’s EU 27 countries became available). 
Figure 1 also tracks the difference between the rates of unemployment of low-skilled persons 
in Slovakia as the first-ranked country over the whole period and between the second-ranked 
countries (the second place was occupied by Bulgaria until 2002, then by Poland, until Czech 
Republic surpassed the Polish unemployment rate of low-qualified, and finally replaced by 
Lithuania, where unemployment of low-educated rose steeply during the crisis). The figure 
demonstrates that over most of the examined series the difference between first-ranked 
Slovakia and the country with the second highest level of unemployment for this workforce 
segment remained abysmal.  
Figure 1 EU countries with the highest unemployment rate of low-qualified workforce over the period 2000 - 
2011 
 
Note: Low-qualified = pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education. Graph also compares the levels of 
EU and SK overall unemployment rates (area charts). 
Source of data: Eurostat database (2013). 
 
 The direct impact of the crisis varying across Europe can be illustrated by a detailed 
view of the four years in figure 2 (we can consider 2008 values as an initial pre-crisis level). 
In this context, the crisis has brought little change in the unemployment rates of the low-
educated in Slovakia when compared to some other European countries; simply because the 
initial level of unemployment of this segment was higher than any other EU member state.  
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Figure 2 Unemployment rates of low-qualified persons in the EU 27 countries 
 
Note: Education level 0 – 2 by Eurostat methodology = pre-primary, primary and lower secondary education. 
Source of data: Eurostat database (2013). 
 
 Obviously, with lower skills and qualifications it is more difficult to obtain 
employment, even in a favourable economic situation; low-qualified persons face barriers to 
entering as well as remaining in employment – in economic turbulence, employability of this 
disadvantaged group slumps. Boosting employment of low-educated persons by better 
targeted vocational training or tailoring education to the labour market's needs remains a top 
priority of today’s policies.  
 
Participation in active labour market policy programs in the SRwith special focus on 
public works programs31 
 The largest group of those activated by the public work programs consists of job 
seekers with primary education as the highest attained level of education. In 2005 they 
represented approximately one half of the total number of persons involved in this type of 
program. The second largest group was formed by job seekers with vocational education 
without school-leaving exam (25 % to 31 %) and job seekers without education (8 % to 15 
%). Based on the statistics of program participation by the job seekers´ highest education 
attained it is clear that the public work programs are used predominantly (in the long-term) 
by those persons with the lowest levels of education (or without education) – during 2005 – 
2011 their share in the total number of participants ranged from 88 % in 2005 to 93 % in 
2011. The participation of persons with higher education levels is very rare. Detailed 
statistics on the public works programs is presented in Table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31 In the cost-benefit analysis we include only the Activation activity allowance by the form of smaller 
community services for a community or smaller services for self-governing regions (§52) among the public 
works programs.  
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Table 1 Statistical data related to public works programs 
 2005 2008 2011 
Number of jobs created by public work programs 156,686 171,739 21,849 
Number of job seekers on public work programs out 
of 100 unemployed persons 46 74.5 5.6 
Number of job seekers on public work programs out 
of 100 long-term unemployed persons 87.8 152.7 11.7 
Total number of unemployed persons activated by 
ALMP program 260,270 253,459 101,783 
Proportion (%) of job seekers activated by public 
work programs out of total number of activated 
unemployed persons 
60.2 67.8 21.5 
Total number of unemployed persons 340,401 230,433 389,264 
Total number of long term unemployed persons 178,520 112, 452 187, 028 
Note: The drop in the number of jobs created by the public work programs after 2008 was due to restrictions of 
the target group persons entitled for program participation and limitations on repeated placement into the 
program scheme. 
Source: Barošová et al. (2012). 
 
 Table 2 presents the expenditure aspect of the public work programs. As illustrated by 
the table, the expenditure on such type of the programs decreased considerably between 2009 
and 2013; the share of the public work programs in total expenditures on the active labour 
market programs (ALMP; categories 2-7) dropped from 5.4 % in 2009 to 2.2 % in 2013. 
Table 2 Expenditures on public works programs (2009-2013)32 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Expenditure on public works 
programs 5,116,507 5,162,078 3,811,079 2,720,817 2,185,422 
Total expenditure on ALMP 
(categories 2-7) 94,388,159 152,660,998 154,190,066 135,714,790 100,947,471 
Proportion (%) on public work 
programs 5.4 % 3.4 % 2.5 % 2.0 % 2.2 % 
Source: Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family. 
 
Methodology 
 In the evaluation process of the economic return of costs spent on the public works 
programs of active labour market policy (ALMP) we used cost benefit analysis (CBA). CBA 
is a useful tool for decision making, whereby it serves to assess whether the costs of a 
particular program which are related to its implementation are less than its benefits. The 
advantage of this method is the ability to assess the overall effectiveness of the program of 
ALMP, which means that in practice there may be a case in which the program can be 
effective in relation to the increasing of the program participants’ employment but it can be 
also very expensive. However, analysis itself does not guarantee that the funds will be 
invested effectively but it helps to reduce the risk that these funds will be invested 
incorrectly. Here it should be noted that in the public sector the economic aspect is not in all 
cases the main criteria for allocation of funds, as well as the fact that nowadays we do not 
have a definition of “disproportionate costs” and therefore decisions on the adequacy or 
                                                          
32 Expenditures in Table 2 do not include expenditures on activation allowances, which are paid to 
unemployed people during participation in the public works programs. For an estimate of the activation 
allowances (around 9.5 mil Euros) for 2011 only for participants who were included in the analysis we took into 
account the number of program participants, the amount of activation allowance and the average duration of 
program participation, which is around 5.75 months.  
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inadequacy of the consequences of ALMP programs related to some extent with what 
Slovakia can and also what is willing to give for the realization of the goals in the field of 
solving problems on the labour market with regard to its economic possibilities. The 
advantage of the cost benefit analysis is also the fact that it allows the description of the 
wider social impacts of particular ALMP programs, which is important for evaluating the 
results which have already been achieved. When using this method, all costs and benefits are 
measured in monetary terms, whereby it is necessary to take into account only the effects of 
the particular program which is being evaluated at that moment. From the perspective of 
realizing programs of active labour market policy, the effects could be measured from the 
program participants', government or the economy as a whole, point of view (table 3). 
Table 3 Overview of the quantifiable costs and benefits arising from the implementation of active labour 
market policy programs 
  Benefits 
 
Costs 
Economy as a 
whole 
Value of new jobs created Total cost of the program Potential multiplication effects 
Government 
Increased taxation 
Total cost of the program Social security/health contributions paid on employees 
Reduction in health and social benefit payments 
Program 
participants Increase of disposable income 
Decrease/loss of state social benefit 
payments 
Source: O´Higgins, N. (2009). 
 
 Problems associated with the quantification of the costs and benefits which are 
difficult to convert to cash flows present the significant limitation of this method. In this case, 
it is possible to express effects only in a qualitative way. Due to the unavailability of data for 
a comprehensive assessment of all aspects of this issue, we will in the next part of this article 
pay closer attention only to the analysis of the costs and benefits for the public works 
programs from the government's point of view, which means from the public finance's point 
of view according to the prof. O´Higgins, N. (2009) methodology. We evaluate only the 
direct effects; indirect effects are not rated. Technically, our approach means that for the 
chosen programs of active labour market policy we will compare the current value of all 
benefits with the current value of all costs related to the realization of the particular programs 
of ALMP in terms of public finances (table 3). In calculating the benefits for the government 
we come out from the analysis of the programs' impact on employment within 15 months 
after ending participation in the programs (figure 3). 33 The analysis of the public works 
programs' impact on the employment of the programs' participants within 15 months after its 
ending showed that participation in these kind of programs slightly reduced the possibility for 
the job seekers to find a working place on the open labour market, which may to some extent 
be related to the lock-in effect or even because of persistence of stigmatization of individuals 
participating in this type of work and these people are in many cases automatically 
considered as less productive which, in the long run, can reduce their likelihood of placement 
on the open labour market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
33 This analysis was performed by Štefánik, M., Lubyová, M., Dováľová, G., Karasová, K. (2014). 
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Figure 3 Employment rates for participants of public works programs and for the participants of the control 
group within 15 months after finishing the program in 201134 
 
Note: Calculated from the individual data of the Centre Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family of SR using 
contrafactual impact analysis. 
Source: Štefánik, M., Lubyová, M., Dováľová, G., Karasová, K. (2014). 
 
 The calculation of benefits for the government over the next five years is based on the 
approximation of the present value of all future flows arising from the realization of the 
particular program. Conversion to the present value is realized by discounting future flows35. 
 Benefits for the state can be expressed as: 
𝐺𝐵 = ∑5𝑛=1 ∑ (𝐻𝐵𝑛,𝑖+𝑆𝐵𝑛,𝑖+𝐼𝐵𝑛,𝑖+𝑇𝑛,𝑖𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑖 )/𝑚, while 
 GB presents government benefits, HB saving in contributions from the health 
insurance company, SB savings on state social benefits, IB contribution to the social 
insurance company and T benefits from direct and indirect taxes (VAT). 
 Two variants have been analyzed. 
 In variant 1 (gross effect) we analysed the impact of the public works programs' 
realization on public finances, thus we compare the costs of the programs with the gross 
benefits of the programs participants in the short term as well as in the mid-term, which 
means within 5 years after finishing participation in the program.  
 In variant 2 (net effect) we analysed the net effect of public works programs, which 
means the gross benefit of the programs' participants reduced by the gross benefit of the 
control group is compared with costs spent for these programs. 
 Gross benefit means only the benefit accruing from the placement of job seekers 
supported under the ALMP program. 
 By net benefit we mean the benefit accruing from the placement of job seekers 
supported under the ALMP program reduced by benefit accruing from the control group. 
 The gross effect means benefits from the ALMP program participants reduced by the 
costs of the particular program. Thus, when calculating the gross effect, we only considered 
whether the costs for the program were returned to the government during the reporting 
period via benefits “derived” from the participants of public works programs. 
 The net effect of ALMP programs on public finances represents the difference 
between net benefits and initial costs for the ALMP programs. In calculating the net effect we 
compared initial costs for the programs with net benefits (gross benefits from program 
                                                          
34  It takes into the account the removing from the database of the Central Office of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Family of the SR due to placement in the labour market.  
35 According to the communication of the European Commission, the reference (discount) rate for the 
SlovakRepublic was from January 2011 set at the level of 1.45 % 
 (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/base_rates_eu27_en.pdf). 
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participants accruing to the government reduced by the benefits from the control group). 
When evaluating the net effect of the program it should be taken into account that the control 
group considers only some common characteristics with the program participants (e. g. age, 
education, sex, region, length of unemployment etc. but some characteristics such as criminal 
records of job applicants etc. could be not considered for objective reasons). So we are aware 
of the fact that there is some disproportion in expressing the situation that would occur in the 
case that the program would not be implemented.  
 Due to the complexity of the issue and the unavailability of necessary data at the time 
of producing the analysis, the authors considered several simplifications: 
• in the cost-benefit analysis we consider only direct costs for the selected 
ALMP program, while abstracting any additional costs in human and material 
resources needed to implement the program; 
• we abstract from the costs associated with the various effects, such as the 
effect of displacement etc.; 
• due to the absence of data on income of job seekers on an individual basis 
from the social insurance company, there were created two scenarios: in 
scenario 1 we consider that job seekers are employed on the open labour 
market only for the minimum wage and in scenario 2 we consider that they are 
employed for the median wage (according to age, region and education) 
• when calculating the tax levy, we have only taken into account a tax allowance 
for the taxpayer on a monthly basis; 
• we abstract from the unemployment benefits; 
• we abstract from the value of leisure time (i.e. from all activities conducted 
outside the labour market, whereby many of these activities can increase social 
benefits, for example childcare, various forms of domestic production etc.)36; 
• we abstract the opportunity costs, representing the value of goods from the 
kind of activities that must be sacrificed in favour of the selected action (in this 
case, implementing ALMP programs) 
• we abstract additional expenses, which could arise for the job seeker during 
the realization of the ALMP program, for example, transportation costs etc.  
• the forecast of benefits for the government for 5 years is based on the 
assumption that the probability of job seekers finding places on the open 
labour market after 15 months of the ALMP program completion is constant. 
 
Financing of ALMP programs in the Slovak Republic 
 Active labour market policy as a tool to combat unemployment is gaining importance 
in many EU countries, as evidenced by the fact that many countries have increased the 
percentage of GDP which is spent on the implementation of particular ALMP programs. 
Some countries, for example Belgium, Austria, Spain and Luxembourg, have increased 
expenditure on ALMP programs (categories 2-7)37 expressed by percentage of GDP as well 
as expenditure on ALMP programs (category 1), which means for labour market services. 
Finland increased spending on ALMP programs (categories 2-7) during the monitored period 
from 0.705 % to 0.857 % of GDP (the largest increase in spending was in category 2 – 
training), however expenditure on labour market services remained relatively small, at 0.124 
% of GDP. In Germany we can observe the slight decrease in expenditure on ALMP 
programs (categories 2-7) from 0.469 % to 0.446 % of GDP, however expenditure on labour 
market services increased from 0.27 % to 0.34 % of GDP. In Slovakia we can see that during 
                                                          
36 See for example D.H. Greenberg (1997). 
37 Category 1 – labour market policy, category 2 – training, category 4 – employment incentives, category 
5 – supported employment and rehabilitation, category 6 – direct job creation, category 7 – start-up incentives. 
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the analysed period expenditure on labour market services slightly decreased from 0.11 to 
0.07% of GDP, while expenditure on ALMP programs (categories 2-7) slightly increased 
from 0.12 % to 0.22 % of GDP, but when compared with the average of EU countries they 
still remain at a relatively low level (figure 4). 
Figure 4 Expenditure on ALMP programs (categories 1-7) as % of GDP (2007-2011) 
 
Source: Based on Eurostat databases. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis of public works programs 
 Public works were originally a tool for direct job creation which stimulated growth of 
labour demand. The effort of their implementers was to prevent deterioration of human 
capital by supporting the returning process of job seekers to the labour market. Nowadays, 
many foreign authors (e.g. Kuddo, 2009) point to the fact that, due to lack of effectiveness, 
this tool is mainly used as a “safety net” which supports an individual's income and as a tool 
for decreasing the poverty rate of disadvantaged individuals on the labour market (in many 
cases these individuals are long- term unemployed people with low qualification).  
 OECD recommends that these types of ALMP programs should be focused primarily 
on the long-term unemployed with low qualification and that the greater effectiveness of 
these programs can be achieved by combining them with the education process. For 
achieving greater efficiency, the proper targeting of these programs is also very important. 
The international experience shows that public works programs are more suitable for long-
term unemployed people in old age, whose mobility is significantly lower and who have little 
chance of being employed in the private sector, especially in areas with high unemployment 
rate (Kuddo, A., 2009). 
 
Qualitative analysis of the public works programs' costs and benefits from the 
participants' point of view 
 According to the monitoring report (Barošová, M. et al., 2012)38, the main qualitative 
benefits for program participants resulting from the nature of this ALMP program, which 
performs several functions (especially activation, socialization and redistribution functions). 
Currently there are mainly low-skilled job seekers activated through this program who are 
very often in material need from the long term perspective and they usually come from 
regions with a high unemployment rate and low employment opportunities.These problems 
are often compounded by the low labour mobility, thus this tool helps to a certain extent 
involve disadvantaged job seekers into work, to get/keep their work habits as well as a form 
of social contact.  
 The redistribution function is related to the income support of program participants, 
who receive an activation allowance amounting to 63.07 Euros during participation in the 
                                                          
38  The monitor report was based on a questionnaire which was answered by 62 employees from different 
regional Offices of Labour, Social Affairs and Family.  
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program, and this contribution is a contribution to the benefit in material need. According to 
conducted monitoring (Barošová, M. et al., 2012), approximately 62 % of respondents 
claimed that these programs are important either to acquire work habits or for the elimination 
of social exclusion of job seekers, or for both of these reasons. 
 Only about 1% of respondents said that these programs are tools for improving the 
financial situation of job seekers and only 2 % of respondents agreed that public works 
programs help the long-term unemployed to find jobs on the open labour market. Clear 
consensus among respondents was not achieved in responses regarding whether these tools 
intensified job searching by job seekers or not (47 % of respondents answered yes and 47 % 
of respondents answered no, while 6 % of respondents did not respond). 
 Among the costs of ALMP program participants we can include especially costs 
associated with the risk of locking job seekers to subsidized job positions, which is connected 
with a reluctance to seek employment in the open labour market (60 % of respondents), as 
well as opportunity costs. 
 
Gross effect of public works programs on public finance 
 The calculation of the gross effect of public works programs is based on the fact that 
in 2011 around 3,811,079 Euros were spent on these programs and about 85 % of expenditure 
came from the European Social Fund (ESF).Taking into account that activation benefits paid 
to the program participants are not included in this amount of money, their calculation is 
based on the average duration of one subsidized working place, which is around 5.75 months 
and on the number of program participants, i.e. 26,095 persons, who were included in this 
analysis (these contributions are paid from the state budget, their total amount is presented in 
Table 1 in brackets, whereby in parentheses we also present the calculations of gross 
revenues reflecting the total amount paid for activation benefits to participants of these 
programs). 
 In Table 5 we can see the effects of providing public works programs on public 
finance in the short (within 1 year) and medium terms (within 5 years).Taking into account 
that participants of these programs are mainly long-term unemployed people with low 
qualification, we consider Scenario 1 as more realistic, which means that participants will be 
employed after completing the program on the open labour market for the minimum wage.In 
regard to the relatively low probabilities of job seeker placement in the open labour market 
within one year after finishing the program, and with respect to the qualification structure of 
program participants, it is not possible to assume that the financial expenses spent in the 
program could be returned to the government in short period, although this should also be not 
expected for this type of ALMP program. 
 Under the certain assumptions which we assumed for the estimation of the gross 
effects (see Methodology), it could be expected that the return period of the expenses for 
public works programs would be in the medium term (within 5 years after completion of the 
program).In the case that we consider only the resources expended from the state budget, it is 
possible to expect a shorter payback period, approximately by one year. 
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Table 5 Gross effect of the public works programs (in Euros) 
Year 
Costs of the programs scenario 1 scenario 2 
State budget ESF Gross benefits Net benefits 
Net benefits 
(state 
budget) 
Gross 
benefits Net benefits 
Net benefits 
(state budget) 
0 571,662 (9,463,417) 3,239,417 x x  x x x 
1. 
year x x 2,102,686 
-1,708,393 
(-
11,171,810) 
1,531,023 
(-
7,932,393) 
3,265,975 
-545,104 
(-
10,008,521) 
2,694,312 
(-6,769,104) 
2. 
year x x 4,959,057 
1,147, 977 
(-8,315,439) 
4,387,394 
(-
5,076,022) 
7,717,257 3,906,177 (-5,557,239) 
7,145,594 
(-2,317,822) 
3. 
year x x 7,823,627 
4,012,547 
(-5,450,869) 
7,251,964 
(-
2,211,452) 
12,181,655 8,370,576 (-1,092,841) 
11,609,993 
(2,146,576) 
4. 
year x x 10,647,254 
6,836,174 
(-2,627,242) 
10,075,591 
(612,175) 16,582,246 
12,771,166 
(3,307,750) 
16,010,583 
(6,547,167) 
5. 
year x x 13,430,524 
9,619,444 
(156,028) 
12,858,861 
(3,395,445) 20,919,939 
17,108,860 
(7,645,443) 
20,348,277 
(10,884,960) 
Note: The estimation of the expenses for the activation allowances is shown in brackets. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Net effect of public works programs on public finance 
 Table 6 shows the net effect of the public works programs. The costs of the programs 
are compared with the net benefits (gross benefits of the programs' participants are lowered 
by the benefits for the government from the control group). The estimation of net benefits is 
based on the probability rates of program participants’ placement in the open labour market 
after finishing the programs and those of control group, which were calculated in the previous 
work (Štefánik, M., Lubyová, M., Dováľová, G., Karasová, K. , 2014) and which we have 
shown in the Methodology section. Because of the higher probability rate of placement in the 
open labour market for a control group than for program participants, net benefits have 
negative values in the case of both scenarios.  
Table 6 Net effects of the public works programs (in Euros) 
Year 
Costs of the programs scenario 1 scenario 2 
State 
budget ESF 
Net benefits 
(participants) 
Net benefits 
(all) 
Net 
benefits 
(state 
budget) 
Net benefits 
(participants) 
Net benefits 
(all) 
Net benefits 
(state 
budget) 
0 571,662 (9,463,417) 3,239,417 x x x x x x 
1. 
year x x -1,308,572 
-5,119,651 
(-
14,583,068) 
-1,880,234 
(-
11,343,51) 
-2,098,220 
-5,909,299 
(-
15,372,716) 
-2,669,882 
(-
12,133,299) 
Note: The estimation of the expenses for the activation allowances is shown in brackets. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 The results of the analysis as well as those of the monitoring suggest that after 
completing the public works programs the chance to find a job in the open labour market for 
the program participants does not increase markedly (e.g. participation in these programs is 
not connected with the education process, which means the discrepancy risk of the necessary 
skills and qualification of job seekers is not reduced), even more on the contrary in some 
cases the chance of participants may decrease (e. g. there is a risk of being trapped in a 
subsidized job, the risk of stigmatization of program participants, who are very often seen as 
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less productive). For this reason we do not expect that the expenses for the public works 
programs could be returned though net effects in the short or medium term.  
 
Conclusion 
 Slovakia is one of the countries with a relatively high unemployment rate and low 
expenditures on active labour market policy. In the past, public works programs were very 
often used as active labour market policy programs, but nowadays the trend is reversed and 
these kinds of programs are mainly used for long term unemployed people with low levels of 
education. International experience shows that if these programs were linked with the 
education process, the job seekers have, after finishing them, a higher chance to be placed on 
the open labour market. This educational element is largely absent in the implementation 
process of public works programs in Slovakia. This is also one of the reasons why, after 
finishing these kind of programs, the chance for their participants to be placed on the open 
labour market does not significantly increase; even the previous analysis carried out from 
individual data from the Central Office of Labour, Social Affairs and Family showed that 
their chances within 15 months after finishing the program were even lower than for the 
control group. This fact may be related to factors such as lock-in effect, also with the reduced 
job seeking intensity during the participation in the program as well as with the persistent 
stigmatization of public works programs, while those job seekers who participated in such 
programs may be seen as less productive.  
 The selection effect has a very important role in the evaluation process of public 
works programs.Job seekers have to meet certain criteria when they want to participate in 
these programs, they have to be long term unemployed and they have to receive benefits in 
material need. These people often have to face several problems at the same time (lack of 
skills, health and social problems etc.), while actually regional Offices of Labour, Social 
Affairs and Family do not have sufficient staff capacity to help them to solve all their 
problems enough to be able to be placed on the open labour market.  
 From our cost-benefit analysis it can be seen that, from the perspective of program 
participants, these programs are very important tools that support low-income job seekers 
and, in many cases, these programs have a very important socialization and activation role 
(i.e. improving of work habits) mainly in those regions where the jobs offer is very low. In 
gross effect, in regard to the relatively low level of probability for program participants to be 
placed on the open labour market after finishing public works programs and with respect to 
their low qualification level, it is not possible to expect that financial expenditure spent on 
these programs could be paid back in a short time period. Under the certain assumptions 
underlying the estimation of gross effects, we can expect a return of expenditure on these 
programs in the medium term, which means within five years. In case that we consider only 
the expenditures from the state budget, we can expect about a one year shorter return period. 
However, on the net effect we do not expect the expenditure return either in the short or 
medium term period. 
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